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Abstract: This article deals with public, political discourse over One Belt One 
Road (OBOR) initiative in Poland. OBOR has recently become very popular 
in Poland as it encapsulates the noticeable fascination on China and on geo-
politics among parts of Polish society. This article describes this phenomenon 
and delaminates the mainstream political discourse over OBOR into two main 
strands: great geopolitical and/or geoeconomic chance (pro-OBOR discourse) 
and security threat (anti-OBOR). The advocates of the former see the project as 
a great geopolitical and economic opportunity for Poland; the supporters of the 
latter find it a threat to Polish security and/or economic interests. This discourse 
echoes internal divisions within current Polish government on its China policy 
and can be observed against the background of China’s dynamic enter to Central 
and Eastern Europe, particularly to Czech Republic, Hungary and Serbia. 
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Introduction
Judging by the number of articles in the media and in internet, by number of lectures 
and short films on You Tube and by frequency of mentioning it in political discus-
sions, China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has recently become popular 
in Poland. It encapsulates the noticeable fascination on China and on geopolitics 
among parts of Polish society. The mainstream Polish political discourse on China 
can be divided into two strands: pro-OBOR enthusiast who see the project as a great 
geopolitical and/or geoeconomic chance for Poland. And anti-OBOR critics who 
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undermine its importance and argue that this project threatens or might threaten 
Polish security. The divisions between those two discourses widened when top Polish 
politicians became engaged in the debate. 
This article will try to present Polish public political discourse on OBOR initiative. 
The need for this article aroused from a demand for academic systematization of 
knowledge about OBOR in Poland: so far this topic has been covered by traditional 
media and internet only, with very few academic articles about Poland on OBOR 
(and – to my best knowledge – none on Polish discourse on OBOR). Thus, it should 
be the first article of such kind. It will try to answer the following research question: 
how OBOR is being portrayed in Polish discourse? What are the main strands of the 
OBOR narrative? What are the main arguments for and against embracing OBOR 
idea by Poland? Whether it is possible to put discourse on OBOR down to the Polish 
political context? Who controls or at least influences this discourse? 
As for theoretical part, the most important terms should be clarified. Discourse, 
or “a speech or piece of writing about a particular, usually serious, subject” (Cam-
bridge English Dictionary, 2017), will be understood here in the political science’s 
understanding of it (without linguistic focus on the discourse itself: this article set 
itself a modest task, without delving into complicated nature of what lies ‘beyond the 
sentence boundary’ and managing the systematic account of the discursive structures). 
Thus, political discourse, (by definition, “articulation of information on policies and 
actions for the public good”, Wilson, 2003), will be understood here as a narrative, 
or group of narratives, that function in the public debate and presents different 
strands of the public opinion. Hence, the political discourse is being concerned here 
with political contexts and political actors (Graber 1981, p. 195); such as politicians, 
political institutions, governments, political media, and political supporters operating 
in political environments to achieve political goals (Wilson, 2003). Although the 
vast bulk of studies of political discourse is about the text and talk of professional 
politicians or political institutions, politicians are not the only participants in the 
domain of politics (van Dijk 1997, p. 13). That is why this this article will not limit 
itself to examine the quotations of politicians only, but will also include voices from 
political analysts and academicians, as when they wish to present a political case they 
become, in one sense, political actors, and their own discourse becomes, therefore, 
political (Wilson, 2003). Finally, in executing political discourse analysis in political 
science this article will draw from Teun van Dijk’s findings that discourse analysis 
allows to see the relations between politics, media and public opinion: “who controls 
public discourse, at least partly controls the public mind” (van Dijk 1997 p. 44)
As for OBOR itself, or, to be correct, Silk Road Economic Belt/Corridor (later: 
One Belt One Road) Initiative was announced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping 
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in Astana, on September 7, 2013. Despite modest beginnings, with time, the OBOR 
concept grew in importance. It became not only a plan for creating a network of 
infrastructural connections), but, “throughout 2014, the concept gradually came to 
be the pivotal issue in China’s foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, in its domestic 
policy (…) “a versatile instrument of Chinese policy”, in both the regional and global 
dimensions (Kaczmarski, 2015). Its echoes reached Poland in 2014/2015 and became 
popular in late 2015/early 2016. 
This came against the background of change of attitude towards China in Poland. 
The impressive economic development of China for long remained socially un-
noticed in Poland: only a few people were interested in Chinese affairs (usually from 
academic/expert circles). Thus, such issues as violating of human rights in China 
or Tibet constituted the mass media image of China and dominated in the social 
consciousness of the Middle Country in Poland. It has started to change gradually, 
from the bottom, thanks to individual contacts, small businesses, travel, tourism 
etc. It has been complemented by the growing fascination of China among Polish 
conservative circles (the reasons for his social phenomenon still need to be researched). 
Politically speaking, the first important right-wing intellectual who proposed political 
rapprochement with China was Antoni Dudek from Jagiellonian University (Dudek, 
2009). His voice, however, came to early, in 2009, and was limited to academic and 
expert circles. That is why growing interest in China was capitalized much more 
effectively by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, a highly controversial, far-right Polish politician 
(see for example: Korwin-Mikke, 2013). Growing interest in China went hand in 
hand with equally dynamic fascination in geopolitics that won the hearts and minds 
of many Polish people (especially young and conservative). The latter has been best 
illustrated by a dialogue in popular TV programme Młodzież kontra (The Youths 
Versus), where Joanna Scheuring – Wielgus a prominent politician from the opposition 
part, Nowoczesna, was asked by a young activist from right-wing Nationalist Party 
about her opinion on the growing Sino-American rivalry and Poland’s position on it; 
Scheuring – Wielgus was clearly surprised and frankly said “I cannot reply because 
I don’t understand what you are talking about” (Kompromitacja posłanki…)
Against this social background political change occurred in Poland. The conserva-
tive PiS party (Law and Justice) won elections and formed the government. PiS in 
late 2015/2016 made a turn towards China which resulted in intensification on 
Sino-Polish relations, best illustrated by visits of Polish President Andrzej Duda in 
China in November 2015, Poland’s accession to Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
in April 2016, and China’s Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to Poland in June 2016. Since 
then China, and particularly its OBOR project, became the part of the mainstream 
political and media discourse in Poland. 
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As for methodology used here, for the sake of this article I have researched articles 
and programmes in all most important Polish media (press, online journals, TV and 
radio) in accordance with the ranking of “most frequently read titles” (regular ranking 
of daily newspapers and weekly journals, published by Wirtualne Media group, Duży 
Spadek Czytelnictwa….) plus I added Polish Radio and 3 most important Polish TV 
stations (TVP, Polsat and TVN) to the list as well as You Tube films (with at least 
5000 displays). Full list of researched media is the following: I) daily newspapers: 
“Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Rzeczpospolita” and „Dziennik Gazeta Prawna”, II) tabloids: 
“Fakt”, “Super Express”; III) weekly journals “Polityka” “Wprost” “Do Rzeczy” “Gość 
niedzielny” “Newsweek” “W Sieci”, IV) online journals, “Obserwator finansowy” 
“Puls Biznesu” “Bankier”; “WPolityce” Money.PL; V) TV and Radio: “TVP” “Polskie 
Radio” “Polsat” and “TVN”, VI) You Tube. 
I have singled out only those articles/programmes that deal with OBOR and 
Poland (thus, I excluded those that deal with OBOR only or those that deal with 
Sino-Polish relations but do not mention OBOR) and I did not mentioned agency 
news reprinted in the newspapers. Although while researching this topic I have tried 
to read/watch every articles/programme/commentary on OBOR in most important 
Polish media in the period of 2014 – 2017, I cannot claim to represent here all media 
news or all commentaries on OBOR. Rather, this article tries to present the most 
representative, influential and opinion-forming political voices about OBOR in 
Poland. 
The chosen timeframe is from 2014 until 1 May 2017; the reason for choosing 
this timeframe is simple: 2014/2015 is roughly the first moment when OBOR idea 
went beyond academic circles in Poland; 1th May is the last moment when this article 
was upgraded. 
Thus, the full quantitative data for this article is the following. I) Daily newspapers: 
“Gazeta Wyborcza” (2014: 0 articles on OBOR; 2015: 9 articles; 2016: 8 articles; 
2017: 6 articles; the number on article on OBOR is slightly higher than in other 
most important daily newspapers as GW has its local brunches and articles from it 
counted together with articles in the main edition of this newspaper); “Rzeczpospolita” 
(2014 and 2015: 0 articles; 2016: 11 articles; 2017: 23 articles); “Dziennik Gazeta 
Prawna” (2014: 1 article; 2015: 10 articles; 2016: 14 articles; 2017: 5 articles); II) daily 
tabloids: “Fakt” (2015: 0 articles; 2016: 4 articles; 2017: 1 article); “Super Express” 
(2015: 1 articles; 2016: 2 articles; 2017: 1 articles); III) Weekly Journals: “Polityka” 
(2016: 1 article); “Wprost” (2014: 1 article; 2015: 6 articles; 2016: 12 articles; 2017: 
1 article); “Do Rzeczy” (2016: 2 articles; 2017: 2 articles); “Gość niedzielny” (2015: 
3 articles; 2016: 3 articles; 2017: 0 articles); “Newsweek” (2015: 1 article, 2016: 2 
articles; 2017: 2 articles); “W Sieci” (0 articles); IV) online journals, “Obserwator 
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finansowy” (2015: 1 articles; 2016: 6 articles; 2017: 1 article); “Puls Biznesu” (2016: 6 
articles); “Bankier” (2015: 7 articles; 2016: 10 articles; 2017: 4 articles); “WPolityce” 
(2014: 1 article, 2015: 6 articles; 2016: 12 articles; 2017: 1 article); Money.PL 
(2015: 21 articles; 2016: 16 articles; 2017: 3 articles); V. TV and Radio: “Polsat” and 
“TVN” – 0 programmes “TVP” (2015: 8 programmes; 2016: 14 programmes; 2017: 
7 programmes), “Polskie Radio” (2015: 16 programmes; 2016: 9 programmes; 2017: 
2 programmes; with Polish State TV – TVP and Polish State Radio – Polskie Radio 
as in the example of Gazeta Wyborcza the number of articles/programmes is higher 
than the average thanks to possession of regional brunches); VI) You Tube (2015: 3 
films with at least 5000 displays; 2016: 15 films; 2017: 6 films). 
Having examined this data, roughly two main streams of the public, political 
China discourse can be classified: the geopolitical chance and the security threat. The 
former dominated in late 2015/early 2016, whereas the latter is more popular since 
Autumn 2016. 
Geopolitical and geoeconomic chance: the pro-OBOR discourse
The optimistic discourse about OBOR can be called geopolitical chance as it combines 
these two elements. It is built on an idea that OBOR, thanks to its geopolitical im-
portance, would bring Poland both political and economic benefits. The geopolitical 
voices were heard more loudly, thus they should be presented first. 
The pivotal person in Polish geopolitical discourse on OBOR is a Warsaw lawyer 
Jacek Bartosiak affiliated in Potomac Foundation, Washington D.C., whose internet 
lectures on geopolitics became incredibly popular in 2015 and 2016 (around 100.000 
visits, e.g., Jacek Bartosiak - o sytuacji Polski…) and his book, based on his PhD 
dissertation, “O Wojnie. Pacyfik i Eurasia (“On War. Pacific and Eurasia”) achieved 
the status of bestseller with more than 10.000 copies sold (Kilkanaście tysięcy….). 
Although Bartosiak’s theories are not much grounded in empirical evidences and 
are presented in the vague language of the geopolitics, the popularity of his views is 
a an intriguing socio-political factor that encapsulates Polish high hopes for country’s 
development and it’s place in the world. 
Bartosiak believes that China’s enter to Central and Eastern Europe constitutes 
a great chance for Poland’s development. Using Wallerstein’s famous world theory 
concept, he claims that “creation of OBOR may change the economic and global 
order”; for him, China is a country that “went from periphery to semi-periphery” 
and “is on the good way to overthrow the entire global system” (Bartosiak 2016a, p. 
354 – 355). By building the transcontinental infrastructure for the economic integra-
tion of the Eurasia from within, China will shift the locus of geopolitical power away 
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from the West and deep into Eurasia. In other words, China wants to overturn the 
global dominance of the West. This means reversal of the consequences of geographi-
cal discoveries and colonialism, or in plain language: the end of Western hegemony. 
Bartosiak compares this situation to the beginning of geographical discoveries, to the 
era of Christopher Colombus: “he came back from his journeys and tells his story, 
but his colleagues do not believe him and are being stuck in their (outdated) world 
outlook” (Nowy Jedwabny Szlak budzi…. ).
According to Bartosiak, OBOR will have a far-flung consequences for Poland. For 
him OBOR means a giant opportunity for the region to achieve „the third structural 
source of capital inflow” (after the first one in 1989 and second one in 2004) and the 
possibility of building a north- south transportation line (projects linking the Balkans 
with the Baltics, like Via Carpathia), which would help accumulate the capital in the 
region. According to him, the most important consequence of the Chinese projects 
in the region lies in overcoming structural obstacles that the Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) faces in the current EU-dependent development (“the Chinese would 
help us do what the Germans don’t allow us to do”) (quoted in: Lubina, 2016). This 
in turn would not only help to accumulate the capital in the region but also may help 
to overcome the obstacles of present model of EU-dependent development which, 
although beneficial, has its own limitations for Poland (Chiny przyszłością….).
For Bartosiak, Chinese OBOR initiative would “put Poland as the first candidate 
to primacy; Poland’s economic potential created by cooperation within OBOR would 
then “affect all Eastern Europe and post-Soviet area” and “create enormous chances for 
development”. An “natural gravitation to Poland from all countries between Russia 
and Germany” would put them into Poland’s orbit. Subsequently, “this process would 
trigger a gradual gravitation towards Poland of the Scandinavian countries, encouraged 
by Polish economic role and its role as the unifier of the north-south and east-west 
axe”. As the result, “all Baltic-Black Sea belt would be exposed to Polish interests and 
would anchor the European margin of the OBOR, attracting trade from dynamic 
Asia; the regional states would orient themselves to Poland in the same way as we 
oriented ourselves on the late 20th and early 21st century to prosperity associated with 
European Union” (Bartosiak, 2016b). 
Bartosiak’s visions are complemented by other enthusiast of OBOR initiative 
who present the economic, or geoeconomic opportunities combined with it. Those 
expectations are built on the belief in Poland’s ability to capitalize its transit position 
between China and Western Europe. It is hoped that Poland would become OBOR’s 
gate to the Western Europe: a potential regional hub. It could help to modernize 
the transportation base, particularly the railway lines (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2013). The 
“geopolitical/geoeconomic chance” discourse emphasized that Poland’s main asset is 
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its geographical location: thanks to convenient geography products going to Western 
Europe need to cross just two borders. Thus, geography makes Poland a natural trans-
portation hub linking Europe with Asia. For example, Professor Bogdan Góralczyk, 
one of Poland’s most famous sinologists, emphasizes Poland’s key geographic location: 
“For Chinese – he writes – “Poland lies in the center of Europe and only this matters” 
(Góralczyk, 2017). “What had been our curse in the previous centuries – he adds in 
another place – that is, the location between Russia and Germany, has now become 
our geostrategic asset” (Muru nie ma…., 2016). Damian Wnukowski, analyst of 
PISM, Poland’s MFA think tank, echoes this statement by saying “Poland, thanks to 
its geographic position, hopes for development of infrastructure and transportation 
links” (Polska na chińskim…., 2016). His optimism is shared by Grzegorz Fingas 
from Polish State Railway Corporation (PKP), who believes in Poland’s chance “to 
become a regional hub that manages the trade volume between China and Western 
Europe, as Poland is on the crossroads of Baltic and Adriatic and Black Sea routes” 
(Nowy Jedwabny Szlak…, 2016). This argument concludes that by taking advantage 
of its convenient geographic position Poland could, therefore, become the Western 
terminal for Chinese goods, which would translate into massive Chinese grants, loans 
and investments (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2013). 
Another advantage would be linking Poland economically with Western China 
(Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ninxia provinces), where there is a potential for Pol-
ish investments, particularly in mining, petrochemical, environmental protection, 
biomedical, pharmaceutical, green technologies, agriculture processing, chemicals, 
and others (Ibid.). Stronger ties with Western China mean a chance for increasing 
trade volume and increasing share of Polish export in it (Polskie firmy…, 2016). This 
should be possible thanks to cargo Chengu-Łódź train that connects those two cities 
in 12 days, much faster than the maritime trade (40 – 50 days) much cheaper than 
air cargo. According to Górlaczyk, this “can make Łódź a logistic-communication 
centre for all Europe” (Lekcje polsko…., 2017). Alongside with Łódź plans exists those 
of establishing a handling centre for goods moving in both directions and/or link 
the container terminal in Małaszewicze near the Belarusian border with the project 
the Chengdu-Łódź cargo rail may become one of Poland’s main economic assets in 
the OBOR idea. (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2013). There are also ambitious plans to make 
Biała Podlaska a transit centre for Chinese goods, connected with Pomerania Special 
Economic Zone that dreams to become a regional hub thanks to “China connection” 
(Grzegorczyk, 2017)
This discourse claims, too, that increasing Poland’s profile on the OBOR route 
would translate into trade opportunities with Central Asian and Southeast Asian 
countries. One of the authors claims that although Poland is economically too weak 
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in comparison with Western European countries, it is much stronger than China’s 
Western and Southern neighbours; thus, OBOR offers chances for Polish investor on 
the Central Asian (infrastructure) and Southeast Asian (commercial goods) markets 
(Stankiewicz, 2016). According to Radosław Pyffel, Poland’s Alternate Director of 
China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), OBOR offers chance for Polish 
investors to find themselves in Asia, the new global economic centre: “it is in Asia 
where there will be the richest middle class, the most dynamic industry where the 
most original ideas will be born. In the past all roads led to Rome, now they will lead 
to Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, New Delhi”; Pyffel says that Polish investors, particularly 
from construction industry should use this opportunity and enter the Asian markets 
which would be in accordance with the Morawiecki’s plan that aims at stimulating 
Poland’s foreign investments and improving their international profile (NowyJedwabny 
Szlak. Wszystkie drogi…., 2017). For him “in the last 25 years all Poland has been 
a construction site, but this is ending now and one needs to find alternative ways; 
today Asia is one, great construction site, particularly Central Asia, Middle East and 
Southeast Asia: it is there where bridges, ring roads, ports, airports and dams will be 
constructed: it is a huge market” (Pyffel: AIIB…, 2017).
Wnukowski echoes Pyffel’s incentive for businessmen by emphasizing Poland’s 
chances in such niches at the Chinese market as environmental technologies, medical 
and mining equipment, cosmetics, IT as well as taking opportunity of the burgeoning 
Chinese middle class and by offering it such luxurious goods as yachts, boats, and 
amber jewelry (Polska na chińskim…., 2016). Anna Antczak from Vistula Academy 
of Finance and Business adds innovations and patents to this list as well as renewable 
sources of energy, new technologies, transportation and construction. 
Another stream of the chance/opportunity discourse shows Poland’s opportunities 
in bilateral relations with China. Hence, Poland could benefit on cooperation with 
China in the energetic sphere: nuclear power (where it could provide sources for this 
project), coal (building new blocks in Ostrołęka energy plant and in Północ power 
station) and shale gas (cooperation in joint exploatation in the uneasy geologic field) 
(Jakóbik, 2016a). This is supplemented by a potential Chinese share in building 
the Central Airport between Warsaw and Łódź (Chińczycy pomogą zbudować…, 
2016). 
Furthermore, the main argument of those advocating for strengthening coopera-
tion with China is the chance for export of Polish agriculture products to China: pork, 
milk and apples. Here improved political relations are correctly seen as necessary for 
commercial success as Chinese market is being protected by a wide range of official 
and unofficial barriers that can be lifted via political means only (Chiński minister…, 
2016). 
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There is also a significant hope of attracting Chinese students to Poland and 
developing Polish-Chinese scientific relations, advocated by Science and Higher 
Education Minister and deputy PM Jarosław Gowin (Wicepremier Gowin…, 2016). 
There are opportunities for cooperation in culture, technology and science spheres 
and Poland can offer a well-educated and mobile labor and entrepreneurship spirit 
of significant part of the society, particularly the young one (Antczak, 2017). Hence, 
the advocates of rapprochement with China and OBOR project see at a great “soft 
power” opportunity for promotion of Polish brands and trademarks on the OBOR 
route – establishing the “brand of Poland” as “a friendly, attractive country with great 
ambitions and capabilities” (Pałkiewicz, 2016). 
Finally, the last argument of the pro-OBOR enthusiasm is based on the notion 
that if Poland does not use the opportunities of this initiative, then our neighbors, 
particularly Czech Republic and Hungary will do it. “There is a significant competi-
tion in Europe for Chinese investments; if Poland does not use it, then Hungary, 
Ukraine or Turkey will” writes Dominik Błędzki (Polska nie wykorzystuje…, 2017). 
Many follow this line of thinking. For example during the meeting of Council for 
Foreign Relations of the President of Poland before Xi Jinping’s visit this argument 
has been frequently used in favor for stronger rapprochement with China (Council 
meeting, 14.06.2016). 
The enthusiastic, pro-OBOR narrative was supported by PiS Government in late 
2015 – mid 2016. During 1+16 meeting in Suzhou in November President Duda 
called OBOR “a great chance” and proposed making Poland “China’s gate to Europe” 
(Chcemy współpracować…, 2015), while PM Beata Szydło, emphasizing our convenient 
geographic location and Łódź-Chengdu train in June 2016, called OBOR “a great 
possibilities and benefits for mutual development” (Premier Szydło…, 2016). The peak 
of official support came during Xi Jinping’s visit to Warsaw in June 2016. Afterwards, 
the official optimist started to wane and the critical voices gained prominence. 
Security threat: the anti-OBOR discourse
The optimistic discourse on OBOR in Poland has been challenged by a critical one. 
Opponents of engagement with China claim that China has been prematurely called 
global contester for hegemony: Beijing has too many domestic problems and too little 
innovative economy for that. Criticism on China is combined with skeptical approach 
to OBOR initiative and its alleged earthshaking consequences. 
Apart from questioning the possibilities of land transportation replacing sea one 
(still only 1/30 of all Chinese export goes to Europe by rail), the critical discourse 
shows that only certain companies, such as the electronic companies, can benefit 
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on this cooperation. For others it makes little economic sense. That is why, OBOR 
is mostly a geopolitical, not economic initiative “which is its main weakness”; thus 
OBOR “will unlikely change the economic map of the world and certainly is not 
such an event as the great geographical discoveries that increased the importance of 
maritime trade” (Dąbrowski, 2016a, b) 
The critical discourse presents OBOR initiative as a hidden goal of the China 
Communist Party’s attempt to resolve domestic problems via international means. 
As one critical analysts writes, China wants to defuse the overproduction in many 
segments of Chinese economy, such as steel works, shipbuilding industries, mining 
industry, steelworks industry, construction and construction materials, textiles and 
clothing industries (Sarek, 2016). According to another opinion, Beijing also wants 
to develop the Western provinces of China which does not automatically lead to the 
development of Poland as the railway transport is still not very important and unlikely 
to improve soon (Dąbrowski, 2016, b)
Aside for questioning the motives and consequences of OBOR, the critical dis-
course warns about negative consequences for Poland challenges in trade and the 
security spheres. 
As for the former ones, it is emphasized that in some potentially perspective trade 
areas (furniture, the mechanical and electrical industry, shipbuilding, machine parts 
or IT) Poland has no chances in dealing with China. It is not only not a partner for 
China but worse – a competitor. According to this discourse, given Chinese industrial 
espionage, Polish-Sino cooperation in these areas may bring Poland more bad than 
good. Even in agriculture, the potential for export of Polish products is limited, be it 
for its size (much smaller than the one oriented to European countries) or for Chinese 
barriers (including for pork) due to “food security” policy. Furthermore, the critical 
discourse highlights China’s dislike for direct foreign investments greenfield type (there 
are many Chinese companies in Poland, but the overall volume of investments is 
low: below 500 million USD; most of this companies trade with China and employs 
Chinese people). Instead of investing in greenfield projects, Chinese prefer to take 
over the already functioning units, which is beneficial for the Chinese side but not 
necessary for those units. Chinese investments, too, may lead to political (national 
security) and economic (dominating the market, state’s losing of control over key 
technologies, industrial espionage) threats (Sarek, 2016). 
As for OBOR itself, the criticism centers on “the need to differentiate investments 
from infrastructure contracts”; the latter apparently consist the essence of Chinese 
approach to OBOR project: „for Chinese money the Chinese companies will build 
railways for us, they will receive their payment, while Poland will have to give back 
this money to China (as any loan which must be returned). In the end, the money, 
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instead of staying in Poland, will come back to China”(Ibid.). Here the example of Laos 
and Thailand is presented, where, after initial enthusiasm for Chinese infrastructure 
projects these projects were suspended or canceled due to the negative impact on 
local economies. The critical discourse claims that the OBOR infrastructure contracts 
are needed for Beijing due to the slowdown of economy and possible bankruptcy of 
many companies: “foreign infrastructure contracts are a brilliant method of solving 
Chinese problems at the others’ expense”. The critical discourse claims that “Poland is 
not ready for China”. Polish state in unprepared for Chinese investments and will be 
exploited accordingly, in a much larger degree than it was in the beginning of 1990s 
when free market entered Poland (Ibid.). 
If the some pro-OBOR advocates labels their intellectual opponents as people 
who do not understand the signs of time, then the critics of OBOR accuse supporters 
of this initiative of having a “pre-colonial mentality”, or “an attitude of the broadest 
cooperation at any cost, including sacrificing national security, in order to drew 
attention of the stronger partner that has a potential to dominate the relationship” 
(Jakóbik, 2016a). In this contexts the critics of OBOR accentuate China’s policy in 
Africa (economically dominated by China) and emphasize the comparisons with 
Central and Eastern Europe (Jakóbik, 2016, b) They, too, emphasize EU’s reserva-
tion about OBOR project by writing “EU can block the Silk Road” (Bruksela może 
zablokować…, 2017). 
The critical discourse has gained supporters among the Poland’s Defense Ministry. 
Antoni Macierewicz, who already in 2015 (before his party won elections) called the 
OBOR initiative “a threat to Poland”, a project which is “a part of Chinese expansion, 
a cooperation between Western Europe, Russia and China to push the United States’ 
influence out of the region” and which “may lead to elimination of independent 
existence of Poland” (though he did not exclude cooperation on some economic 
projects (Antoni Macierewicz o Nowym Jedwabnym Szlaku…, 2015). Actions followed 
his words. In late 2016 his Defense Ministry has nullified the public bid for allotment 
in the center of Łódź. This well-located in the very heart of the city 33-hectar area 
belongs to Military Agency Property and was intended to become the reload center 
for the Łódź-Chengdu train (a special economic zone was even created to serve this 
purpose). There was a concrete buyer in sight: Hatrans, a Polish-Chinese joint venture 
(with dominant Chinese capital) that planned to upgrade this area to fill the increasing 
need for more trains on Łódź-Chengu route. The Defense Ministry, however, has 
suspended the auction for this allotment again.
According to Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper, the Chinese considered it as a hostile 
action, closed their office and came back to China; thus Antoni Macierewicz “has 
killed” this perspective business and damaged the long years of regional Łódź politi-
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cians attempt to attract Chinese investments there (Frąk, 2017). Other liberal media 
soon followed. “Newsweek Poland” commented that “Macierewicz sees OBOR as 
a conspiracy” and undermines it by blocking Polish-Chinese cooperation (Nowy Jed-
wabny Szlak. Macierewicz…, 2017). Oko.Press, founded by former Gazeta Wyborcza 
deputy editor-in-chief, even titled their article “Macierewicz ripped the New Silk 
Road” (Majmurek, 2017).
According to analyst Wojciech Jakóbik from “Biznes Alert” Macierewicz has 
“pulled Poland out from the Silk Road”. Jakóbik echoed opinions saying that this 
decision undermined Łódź politicians attempts to develop relations with China, but 
he justified it by alleged Chinese anti-Polish actions in Czech Republic. According 
to Jakóbik, anti-Chinese actions of Macierewicz was a retaliation against the hostile 
actions of Chinese company J&T Finance Group (part of CEFC China Energy 
Company Limited) which compete with Poland’s state oil agency PKN Orlen in 
the Czech market. Jakóbik writes that “increasing Chinese influences in Central and 
Eastern Europe benefits such pro-Russian politicians” in the region as Czech deputy 
PM Andrey Babisz who due to his personal conflict of economist interests struggles 
politically with PKN Orlen. Jakóbik’s overall argument is that Chinese companies 
are simply a cover of Chinese secret services agencies which work hand in hand with 
the Russian ones to the detrimental of Polish interest in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Jakóbik, 2017)
Jakóbik continues his defense of Macierewicz by pointing out the so-far failures 
of Polish-Chinese cooperation. According to him, despite increasing diplomatic 
activity, the Polish-Sino cooperation has not yet bore fruit. China will not finance 
Polish atom energy project as this project losses ground to coal energy. In the latter 
China just wants to take over Polish power stations (such as Połaniec power station) 
without taking responsibility for their investments: “they just want to make money 
as the investments funds do and they do not want to go deeper”. Taking this into 
account, and in the circumstances of Poland being in NATO and EU, “the hopes of 
Warsaw-Beijing alliance should be considered in the realm of fantasy”; thus, according 
to Jakóbik, Macierewicz has just done a Coup de grace to already problematic Polish-
Sino cooperation (Ibid.). 
Jakóbik’s interpretation was challenged by Radosław Pyffel who accused Jakóbik 
of using weak sources and lack of evidences; Pyffel understated the importance of 
Macierewicz’s actions by writing that Łódź is not the only place for Chinese invest-
ments in Poland and that the failure of acquiring one block does not automatically 
mean the failure of grand OBOR scheme (Pyffel, Facebook profile, 2017).
Macierewicz’s actions evoked public reactions from prominent politicians, too. 
Piotr Marzec, MP and deputy chairman of the Parliament Polish-China commission 
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from right-wing and often sympathetic to PiS government Kukiz Party, publicly asked 
the Development Ministry (headed by deputy PM, Morawiecki, a supporter of closer 
cooperation with China) whether they are still interested in the OBOR initiative; he 
also accused the Defense Ministry of “lack of understanding of geopolitical realities” 
(Poseł Liroy-Marzec…., 2017).
Soon opposition politicians followed. Rafał Trzaskowski, PM from opposition 
party Platforma Obywatelska and former deputy foreign minister, during parliament’s 
discussion on the expose of current foreign minister, reminded the government of 
its earlier enthusiasm about OBOR and accused Macierewicz of “torpedoing all 
Chinese investments” (quoted in: Antoni Macierewicz, zrobię wszystko…, 2017). 
Macierewicz called these accusations „false” and „resulting from an Trzaskowski’s 
absolute incompetence”; he moved on by ensuring the parliament that “all necessary 
actions will be taken to make sure that the dry port in Łódź will be managed by 
a Treasury of State’s company, not by people of unknown conduite” (Exposé Witolda 
Waszczykowskiego…, 2017); (Macierewicz referred here to a widely unknown Chinese 
company New Silk Road Company Limited which possesses 49% of actions in in 
the Polish-Chinese company Euroasia Rail Terminal which plans to build the rail 
terminal, (Nowy Jedwabny Szlak. Macierewicz…, 2017). Macierewicz also emphasized 
that the investment in Łódź is important for him: “I will do whatever is necessary 
to guarantee the security of Polish state there and the fulfilment of this investment” 
(Exposé Witolda Waszczykowskiego…, 2017).
Macierewicz’s stance most probably reflects an internal split within PiS government 
between the supporters of rapprochement with China who represent the economic 
resorts (Morawiecki, Gowin) and the opponents of if from Defense Ministry who 
advocate stronger Polish-American ties and see Chinese influences as a threat more 
than a challenge (Polska nie wykorzystuje…, 2017). This split reflects the dual nature 
of Polish discourse on OBOR, between what can be called the geopolitical dreamers 
and security keepers. 
What is also interesting in this discourse is the fact that it is challenging to put it 
down to the Polish political context as the lines of division are intertwined between 
two main political parties (ruling social-conservative PiS and opposition liberal-
conservative PO) as well as other parties and their supporters. However, if one is 
forced to generalize, then these discourses would rather be more associated with 
right-wing politicians, intellectuals and supporters that are closer to PiS than to PO, 
but they represent different strands within mainstream conservative narrative about 
Poland and its place in the world. That is why it is much safer to group them not by 
their domestic divisions (be it party, class or ideology differences) but rather by their 
foreign policy orientation: more balanced one (geopolitical dreamers) and strident 
Michał Lubina234
pro-American one (security keepers).It is almost impossible, too, to tell who controls 
the Polish discourse on OBOR: it seems to be patch worked, done by individuals, 
bottom-to-top and uncontrolled by a single entity; judging by available, public sources 
it is impossible to tell who influenced which ideas (perhaps with other, non-public 
knowledge, it would be easier to do so); on the other hand it is much easier to point 
the beneficiaries of these two strands of Polish OBOR discourse: in case of geopolitical 
dreamers it is clearly China; in case of security keepers it is United States. As for Polish 
interests, all sides claim to represent it. 
Summary: Great Plans, Little Results
Both sides of the Polish discourse on OBOR as well as people who try to find middle 
ground between these two sides and foreign commentators in early 2017 seem to 
agree on one thing: despite much talk about grand opportunities for bilateral coop-
eration, so far little has been done on OBOR initiative in Poland and the Polish-Sino 
cooperation remains limited. 
According to PAIIZ (Polish Agency of Information and Foreign Investments) in 
2015 Chinese investments in Poland amounted to only about 90 million USD, while 
Polish in China – 130 million euro (Kublik, 2015). So far plans for the Chinese to 
become the strategic investor of Polish Airlines LOT or their share in the Central 
Airport, or even Polish-Sino satellite did not materialize. The same can be said about 
Chinese share in Polish energy plants, coal industry, atom energy or railway infra-
structure. Poland, as before, is exporting agriculture goods mostly meat, chocolate, 
syrups and milk (Majmurek, 2017). 
Despite improvement on the export of Polish apples and chickens to China (previ-
ously blocked by Chinese side), no significant Chinese investments in Poland are under 
way and PiS government, despite its vocal declaration did not develop significantly 
the economic relations with China. As Góralczyk writes, the Chinese seeing that 
relations on the central level are stalled, decided to move with investments to local level 
(Stalowa Wola, Kraśnik, Kutno, Opole, Chełm, Mława are most important examples 
of Chinese investments in provincial Poland); nevertheless, according to him, Polish 
dissidents are still not ready for the Chinese (Góralczyk, 2017). 
Despite these local level investments, when taken overall and when judging by 
the perspective of February 2017, the OBOR initiative has not shaped the economic 
or (geo)political fundaments of Poland. The supporters of OBOR as a geopolitical 
opportunity call it “a waste chance” (“inability to struck a reasonable balance between 
geopolitics and economic interests” Poland accordingly „is unable to set its strategic 
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goals and use the benefits from this project”, Antczak, 2017) while security keepers 
sigh with relief. The outcome of this situation for Poland remains to be seen. 
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